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THE UNITED KINGDOM AS AN
EXPORTER OF CAPITAL
BENJAMIN J. COHENFletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy
• THE United Kingdom has traditionally been a substantial exporter of
• long-term capital. In the nineteenth century no other country loaned
nearly so much abroad to so many for so long. And even into the 1920's
) the London capital market was still a prime source of external finance.
In the decades since the Great Depression, however, dramatic changes
have occurred in Britain's position as a capital exporter. The purpose
of this paper is to review some of these more recent developments.
The paper will concentrate on the period since 1952, and in par-
ticular on the years since 1958.' Admittedly, this is a short focus; a
longer perspective might have been preferable. But unfortunately we
are constrained by data inadequacies. Unitl 1952 no separate statistics
exist for private long-term movements, these being lumped together
with miscellaneous official long-term capital, nonreserve short-term
movements, and the so-called "balancing item" (errors and omissions).
Moreover, even though separate estimates of private capital flows have
been published since 1952, those published before 1958 are not neces-
sarily very accurate or complete. Only since 1958 are there compre-
• hensive, detailed, and reliable data on both official and private long-
term capital movements.
The paper will be divided into two parts. Part1will consider
•r changes in the magnitude, direction, and composition of British capital
:;
exportssince 1952. Here I shall argue that the main impact of these
NOTE: Theauthor was affiliated with Princeton University at the time of the con-
ference.
'The period prior to 1952 is already covered by an extensive literature, including in
particular A. K. Cairncross, HomeandForeign Investment, /870—19/3. Cambridge,
Mass., 1953; A. H. lmlah, Economic Elements in thePoxBritannica, Cambridge, Mass.,
1958; E. V. Morgan, StudiesinBritish Financial Policy, /914—25, London, 1952; and
United Nations, International Capital Movements During the Inter-War Period, Lake
Success, N.Y., 1949.
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developments has been to begin a transformation of the United King-
dom from its role as an originator of funds to essentially that of entre-
pôt. Part 2 will then take up some aspects of the recent history of
• official British capital controls. Here I shall argue that so far as Britain
• is concerned, capital restriction is a cheaper means of adjusting the r
balance of payments than either trade restriction or domestic demand
management (expenditure reduction), which in the short term (given
a decision to maintain a fixed rate of exchange) are the other policy





Since1952 Britain has exported capital regularly and in fairly a
substantial volume. But as compared with earlier periods of sizable
British net investment abroad—specifically, the gold-standard era a
and the 1920's—significant changes have occurred. First, in relative c
terms the scale of capital exports has been much reduced. Secondly, g
the geographic pattern of lending has become much more concentrated
than previously, outflows now being directed primarily toward the
sterling area; vis-à-vis nonsterling areas, capital is now imported on
balance. And finally, the composition of lending has altered radically.
Portfolio investment, traditionally the commonest form of lending
abroad, has declined in favor. Today it is subordinated to official capital
flows (including grants as well as loans), arid to direct investment, A
where British residents have a controlling interest in the foreign opera-
tion.
•
Theimplication of all these changes is that the United Kingdom is p4.
ceasing to be of much importance as a source of net capital exports.
Today it is much less a provider of funds than it is a processor. Essen-
tially, it is becoming an intermediary—an entrepôt for long-term in-
vestments. Britain has long functioned as a clearing bank at the short-
term end of the market. Now, increasingly, at the long-term end, it is
functioning as an investment bank as well.THE UNITED KINGDOM AS EXPORTER OF CAPITAL•27
Althoughshort-term financial markets are not the subject of this
paper, it would not be inapposite at this point to remind the reader
f briefly of what recently has been happening there. Basically, over the
last decade or so, Britain has developed almost exclusively into the
role of middleman. The role is formalized institutionally in the Euro-
dollar market which, although extraterritoriat and international, hap-
pens to be centered functionally in the City of London, where the
largest part of its business is done. The City does not provide its own
funds in the Eurodollar market: what it does provide is the flexibility
and expertise of its financial institutions. It processes and adapts other
people's money to be used by other people. It is a fixer—a clearing
bank in the classic sense, taking deposits and lending, but venturing
little of its own capital.
In a similar fashion, this seems to be happening in the long-term
sphere as well, albeit rather less formally and rather more slowly. The
major theme of this paper is that the United Kingdom is developing
almost exclusively into a middleman in capital markets, too. Once the
• country was an international investor; now, primarily, it is becoming
an international investment banker. The change may be seen in the
comparatively narrow margin between gross long-term outflows and
gross long-term inflows, especially in recent years. It may be seen as
well in the increasing dependence of long-term outflows on short-term
inflows (net): little of Britain's net capital export today is transferred
in the form of real goods and services; the country, more and more,
must borrow short in order to lend long. The change may also be seen
in the geographic pattern of net outflows to sterling-area countries
offset to a considerable extent by net inflows from nonsterling areas.
And, most obviously, it may be seen in the thriving international bond
(Eurobond) market, where for long-term portfolio investors the City
now performs precisely the same function it does for short-term de-
positors and borrowers in the Eurodollar market—namely, the func-
tion of fixer. All of these developments appear to point in the same
direction, toward the conclusion that I have suggested.
S
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TABLE 1














by to Move-ment mentment Out- In- Ex-
U.K.aU.K."mentAbroad in U.K.Abroadflow flowports
1952 66 104 —38 127 13 114 193 117 76
1953 53 65 —12 173 28 145 226 93 133
1954 39 —3 42 238 75 163 277 72 205
1955 84 —I 85 182 122 60 266 121 145
1956 71 —44 115 258 139 119 329 95 234
1957 68 80 —12 298 126 172 366 206 160
1958 67 —57 124 310 164 146 377 107 270
1959 60 —146 206 303 172 131 363 26 337
1960 125 —72 197 322 233 89 447 161 286
1961 99 —64 163 313 426 —113 412 362 50
1962 181 —44 225 242 248 —6 423 204 219
1963 192 —45 237 320 276 44 512 231 281
1964 243 —36 279 399 152 247 642 116 526
1965 246 —16 262 354 237 117 600 221 379
1966 263 3 260 304 272 32 567 275 292
1967 267 22 245 457 380 77 724 402 322
1968 211 54 157 736 573 163 947 627 320
MAGNITUDE
British capital movements since 1952 are summarized in Table I.
Official movements differ from the published statistics in that they in-
clude grants as well as intergovernment loans (net of repayment) and
other official long-term capital. In most years, repayments by the
government of the United Kingdom on previous loans from abroad
I
SOURCE: United Kingdom Balance of Payments, selected issues.
a Loans net of repayments; also includes British government subscriptions and con-
tributions to international organizations, and other British official long-term capital (net).
"Loans net of repayments.
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have exceeded new loans received. Private movements include net
overseas investment by British residents (direct plus portfolio) less
net investment by foreigners in the United Kingdom. Over-all move-
ments are recorded in the final three columns of the table.
On balance, Britain exported capital in every year between 1952
— and1968, at an average over-all rate of some £250 million per annum.
in certain years net capital exports were diminished because of Un-
usual inflows of funds—as in 1952 and 1953, for instance, when more
than £220 million of defense aid was received from the United States
IS government.Likewise, in1957 and again in 1966—68 there were
6 large special credits totalling some £325 million from the United States
3 Export-Import Bank for the purchase of American military aircraft
5 andmissiles, and in 1961 there was a £132 million increase in the
.5. foreign private-investment figure for the United Kingdom, reflecting
the Ford Motor Company purchase of locally held shares in its British
subsidiary. If these extraordinary inflows are excluded, the average
7 over-all rate of British capital exports was really in the vicinity of some
£290 million per annum.
o
. Figureslike these are impressive. The scale of British grants and
9 investment abroad certainly has been substantial—indeed, in absolute
terms, more substantial than either under the gold standard or during
the 1920's. But we must keep such numbers in perspective. In relative
terms British foreign lending is much less important than it ever was
2 before the Great Depression. Prior to 1930 net capital exports, as a
o proportionof national income, tended as a rule to fluctuate in a fairly
- regularcyclical fashion, betweenIper cent of the gross national
product at the bottom of the cycle and 6—7 per cent at the peak.2 Since
1). 1952, by contrast, net capital exports have accounted for hardly more
thanI per cent of the gross national product of the United Kingdom.
To be sure, net capital exports did accelerate rapidly over the
period in review. During the 1950's the average rate of outflow was
only £195 million a year million if extraordinary inflows are
excluded), whereas during the 1960's it was higher, at £300 million
a year million if extraordinary inflows are excluded). This re-
flected a substantial increase in the average rate of gross outflows of
capital, from £300 million a year in the 1950's to £585 million in the
2AlexanderG. Kemp, "Long-Term Capital Movements." in D. J. Robertson and
L. C. Hunter, eds., TheBritish Balance of Pav,nenis, London,1966. p. 137.30 INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
1960's.Butthisincrease was not out of line with the growth of the
British economy in general or of its total foreign trade: in relation to
the gross national product and visible trade, capitalexports did not
rise significantly. On the other hand, there did happen to be a large
rise in gross long-term inflows between 1952 and 1968. Consequently,
over the period as a whole, net capital exports as a percentage of gross
capital exports actually fell—from roughly two-thirds in the 1950's to
only about one-half in the 1960's. This emphasizes the evolving trans-
formation of Britain's capital function from investor to investment
banker: today, half of the country's gross investment abroad is based
on someone else's money.
Why is there now such a narrow margin between gross outflows
of long-term funds from the United Kingdom and gross inflows? Why
has the country ceased to be of much importance as a source of net
capital exports? One is tempted to suggest that itis because of the
stringency of exchange-control regulations: relax the restrictions and
lending is sure to increase. But such an answer obviously would be
naive, confusing cause and effect. Certainly British exchange controls
are tight, but they are tight precisely because, given its present eco-
nomic behavior, the country cannot increase its net foreign lending.
Britain presently absorbs far too large a proportion of its current in-
come for its own purposes—for private and public consumption and
for home investment. Not enough is left to invest abroad. In brief,
there is no exportablesurplus. Theonly way to increase net capital
exports is to increase the exportable surplus—that is, to reduce real
domestic absorption relative to real national income—but so far no
postwar British government has been able to figure out how to do this.
For evidence of the narrowness of the capacity for foreign lending,
we may consider net capital exports specifically in relation to the
other major categories of the balance of payments—the balance of
current transactions and the balance of monetary movements. These
are shown in TableThe former balance (assuming it is in surplus)
is an indication of the extent to which the net export of financial capital
Inthetable,the balance of current transactions as recorded in British statistics is
adjusted to exclude net official transfers, which for our purposes are included in net
capital exports. The balance of monetary movements is adjusted to include the "balanc-
ing item" (errors and omissions), on the grounds that this item reflects mainly unrecorded
flows of short-term funds.THE UNITED KINGDOMAS EXPORTEROFCAPITAL• 31
TABLE 2
•t
Long-Term Capital Exports, Current Balance, and Monetary Movements

















































































SOURCE: United Kingdom Balance of Payments, selected issues.
aRepresentsthe excess (net) of the second column over the first column.
is translated into a genuine transfer of capital—a movement of real
goods and services. The latter is an indication of the extent to which,
in a macroeconomic sense, the net outflow represents merely an ex-
change of one type of asset or liability for another—short-term bor-
rowing (net) for long-term lending. It can be seen from the table that
throughout the 1950's, and even as late as 1963, British capital exports,
though small, were at least generally transferred successfully. Except
*
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for 1955 and 1961, the current account was continuously in surplus,
often by considerable amounts. Over the period as a whole the cumu-
lative net outflow of real goods and services accounted for more than
two-thirds of the net export of financial capital. After 1963, by con-
trast, the balance of payments was in almost continuous crisis, and the
current account recorded a cumulative deficit of near-record propor-
tions (for peacetime). Net long-term foreign lending was thus based
entirely on net short-term borrowing from abroad—in other words,
once again, on someone else's money. Overseas short-term borrowing
mainly took the form of accumulation of liquid liabilities rather than
liquidation of short-term assets.4
DIRECTION
Britain's developing role as an intermediary in capital markets is
emphasized too by the geographic pattern of long-term inflows and
outflows. Detailed statistics on the direction of capital movements
were not available before 1958. However, since then a clear pattern
has been evident: net outflows to sterling-area countries are offset
to a considerable extent by net inflows from nonsterling areas (Table
3). This is a pattern reinforced and encouraged by British exchange-
control regulations, which make a sharp distinction between sterling-
area countries (the so-called "scheduled territories") and others.
Restrictions on capital exports have been in operation since 1939.
But traditionally restrictions have not been applied to the bloc of coun-
tries which (in addition to maintaining a portion of their reserves in
London) enforce a system of controls similar to Britain's. In effect,
exchange regulation operates around the whole group of sterling-as-
sociated countries rather than around the United Kingdom alone;
within the group, relative freedom of investment prevails.5 It should
Between 1962 (the first year for which such data are available) and 1968, while
Britain's total long-term assets rose by £5billion,liquid liabilities increased by more
than £9 billion, from roughly 70 per cent of the sum of long-term assets to over 100 per
cent. Short-term assets meanwhile rose by just billion, and long-term liabilities
by a little more than £2 billion. "An Inventory of U.K. External Assets and Liabilities:
End-1968," Bankof England Quarterly Bulletin, December.1969, pp. 444—445.
Thisis what first defined the sterling area formally as a legal entity. During the
1930's it had not been much more than an arrangement de convenance, an informalI
THE UNITED KINGDOM AS EXPORTER OF CAPITAL 33
TABLE 3
Direction of Long-Term Capital Exports, 1958—68
not be surprising, therefore, that British capital outflows over the years
have tended to be mainly concentrated within the sterling area itself.
in fact, outflows to the sterling area have been sizable, averaging
almost £290 million a year in 1958—63,andrising to more than £410
million a year thereafter. The rise reflects principally an increase of
private investment outflows; United Kingdom government grants and
loans (net of repayments) in the sterling bloc have held relatively steady
since about 1964. But at the same time inflows from nonsterling areas
have also been sizable, reflecting a high rate of both portfolio and
grouping of countries with close commercial andfinancialconnections. But from 1939
on, it became a formal monetary region defined technically by British exchange-control
regulations. In recent years some restriction has been imposed on capital transfers even
within the sterling area. See below. For a valuable survey of British exchange controls
over the years, see "The U.K. Exchange Control: A Short History," Bankof England
































































































































SOURCE: UnitedKingdomBalance of Payments, selectedissues.
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direct investment in the United Kingdom, particularly from the
United States. (Net inflows would have been even larger but for the
British government's need to meet the annual installments on Canadian
and American postwar loans.) It is evident that British capital exports
over-all would be much smaller were it not for this steady net inflow
of funds from nonsterling sources.
COMPOSITION
Regarding the composition of inflows and outflows, the most
striking development recently is the rise to prominence of official
• capital movements. Exceptduring the two world wars, the British
government did not take much hand directly in the import or export
• of capital; that was the province of private borrowers and lenders.
Traditions change, however, and in the postwar period the government
itself has become a prime mover of long-term funds. While private
capital exports have been held down by exchange restrictions, public
• capital exports have burgeoned. In fact, the change has been swift.
As late as just a decade ago, official outflows still accounted for only
about one-third of Britain's net capital exports, and private outflows
for two-thirds. But in the last decade positions have been rapidly re-
versed; today, official outflows account for 80 per cent or more of the
net total, private outflows for under 20 per cent (Table I).
The details of official capital movements are summarized in Table
4. The role played by grants is outstanding. In the early 1950's, inward
transfers were large enough to produce over-all net inflows of public
funds; in the 1960's, outward transfers have been sufficient to explain
the sharp rise of over-all outflows. Grants received by the British
• government between 1952and1958 consisted almost entirely of de-
fense aid from the United States. Grants by the United Kingdom
government, on the other hand, have been largely for economic rather
than military purposes: for bilateral economic assistance plus sub-
scriptions and contributions to international aid organizations. United
Kingdom government loans likewise have been largely in connection
with the British foreign-aid program. Loans to the United Kingdom ai
government have been unimportant, apart from the Export-Import Er




(net of (net of ward
repay-Other repay- Move-
Grantsments)(net)aTotalGrantsments)Totalment
1952 62 —16 20 66 120 —16 104 —38
1953 6l —27 19 53 122 —57 65 —12
1954 65 —34 8 39 51 —54 —3 42
l955 70 4 10 84 47 —48 —1 85
1956 73 —20 18 71 26 —70 —44 115
l957 75 —16 9 68 21 59 80 —12
1958 77 —16 6 67 3 —60 —57 124
1959 82 —28 6 60 — —146 —146 206
1960 94 20 11 125 — —72 —72 197
1961 118 —48 29 99 — —64 —64 163
1962 121 47 13 181 — —44 —44 225
1963 132 52 8 192 — —45 —45 237
1964 163 65 15 243 — —36 —36 279
1965 177 50 19 246 — —16 —16 262
1966 180 64 19 263 — 3 3 260
1967 188 61 18 267 — 22 22 245
1968 178 60 —27 211 — 54 54 157
a Includessubscription and contributions to international organizations,
and other United Kingdom official long-term capital (net).
Bank credits for military purchases in 1957 and 1966—68; in all other
years since 1952 repayments on previous loans have exceeded new
loans received.
After stagnating throughout most of the 1950's, the British foreign-
aid program accelerated rapidly following the 1958 Commonwealth












SouRCE: United Kingdom Balance of Payments,selected issues.
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developed Commonwealth members, the United Kingdom pledged
to expand its aid effort—and expand it did. Between 1959 and 1964
development grants and loans each were approximately doubled in
volume.6 However, after 1964 a new stagnation set in, albeit on a
higher plateau than previously, owing to the crisis of the balance of
payments. There has been little further increase in the program, de-
spite the fact that Virtually all aid today is tied to the purchase of British
goods and services, either customarily (as in the case of dependent
territories) or by regulation. According to one estimate, taking "switch-
ing" into account, the "flowback" to British exports amounted to
nearly three-fifths of Britain's bilateral aid (net of repayments) in
For political reasons practically all of Britain's bilateral aid goes to
sterling-area countries. The main recipients include India and Pakistan
(which between them get about one-quarter of all British economic
assistance) and the former colonies of East and Central Africa.
Private capital movements in recent years have been dominated
by direct investment flows. Detailed statistics on the composition
of private capital movements were not available before 1958. The
data since then are summarized in Table 5. They show that direct
investments accounted for almost two-thirds of the total of net private
investment in either direction between 1958 and 1968. And indeed,
the actual fraction was probably even higher than that—perhaps as
high as three-quarters, possibly even as high as four-fifths—since
"other" investments in the British statistics include investments by
the oil companies. These are known to be large, and are thought to be
mainly direct investments rather than portfolio.
The reasons for the relative dominance of direct investment in
private capital movements are not difficult to discover. As far as out-
ward movements are concerned, the principal explanation seems to lie
in the differential severity of Britain's exchange-control regulations.
6The apparent increase of loans in Table 4 is exaggerated owing to substantial loan
repayments by Germany and France (averaging £65milliona year in 1959—61), which
terminated after 1961. The increase of gross loans between 1959and1964 was from £48
million to £85 million. The figures in the table are not adjusted for interest payments on
Britain's development loans, which averaged nearly £25 million a year in 1963—65.
Ministryof Overseas Development, BritishAid: Statistics of Official Economic Aid to
Developing Countries, London,1967.
Andrzej Krassowski, "Aid and the British Balance of Payments." Moorgateand
Wall Street, Spring,1965, p. 32.I
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TABLES
Private Long-Term Capital Movements, 1958—68
i million)

































































































































SOURCE: United Kingdom Balance of Payments, selected issues.
aExcludingoil and, before 1963, insurance.
I)Includedin portfolio investment.
Portfolio outflows have traditionally been restricted more tightly than
direct-investment outflows (even though the latter, unlike the former,
are subject to administrative control). As far as inward movements are
concerned, the principal explanation seems to lie in the uncertainty
regarding the sterling exchange rate.Portfolio investors are
couraged by the risk of potential devaluation or a floating rate. Direct
investors, meanwhile, are encouraged by the general expansion of
the British economy, and also, it has been suggested, by "the relative
inefficiency of British entrepreneurs either in discovering investment
opportunities or in translating them in practice."
Between 1958 and 1968 the rate of direct investment in the United
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Kingdom as well as of direct investment abroad (both excluding the
oil industry) virtually tripled. However, it is interesting to note that
the increases of investment have not been matched by correspondingly
large increases of funds actually flowing into or out of the country.
British statistics (unlike those of the United States) define "direct
investment" in either direction to include the parent company's share
of the unremitted profits of overseas subsidiaries that are retained
for reinvestment (a contra item being entered additionally in the cur-
rent account opposite "direct investment income"). As it happens,
unremitted profits have accounted for a rising proportion of the re-
corded investment totals: in 1958 they comprised half of the total in
either direction; a decade later, some two-thirds. Thus, in absolute
terms, outward investment other than unremitted profits is more or
less unchanged from what it was in the late 1950's (undoubtedly re-
flecting the stringency of British exchange restriction) and inward
investment has grown only moderately.
About 55 per cent of British direct investment abroad (whether
or not unremitted profits are included) is in the sterling area, about
45percent in nonsterling areas. By far the largest share of total
investment (two-thirds to three-quarters) goes to developed rather
than to developing areas—the biggest beneficiaries being rapidly
growing economies such as (within the sterling area) Australia and
South Africa, and (outside the sterling area) the United States, Canada,
and the countries of the Common Market. Virtually all of the foreign
direct investment in the United Kingdom comes from nonsterling
sources, in particular from the United States. Manufacturing accounts
for well over half of the total movement in either direction.9
Portfolio movements in recent years have resulted in net inflows
of investment funds into Britain. Apart from the years immediately
preceding devaluation, foreign investors have bought sterling securities
on balance, including both corporate and government issues. The
pound is still widely regarded as a convenient international store of
value. British investors, conversely, have tended steadily to liquidate
foreign security holdings on balance, except during the period immedi-
For details on these and other aspects of direct investment in and out of the United
Kingdom, see the successive articles on overseas investments in Boardof Trade Journal,
June 30, 1967; July 19, 1968; and May 9, 1969.THE UNITED KINGDOM AS EXPORTER OF CAPITAL•39
ately following devaluation. New purchases abroad are effectively dis-
couraged by the obligation that they go through the so-called "invest-
ment-dollar market"; the requisite foreign exchange can only be
obtained from the proceeds of new sales of foreign securities by British
residents. Lately the premium on investment dollars has sometimes
been as high as 50 per cent over the official exchange rate. New sterling
issues in the London capital market have been insignificant, averaging
(after redemptions) no more than £5 million a year. Only sterling-area
and (since 1963) European Free Trade Association borrowers are
permitted to float new sterling issues in London, and even they must
take their place on the queue and wait their turn.
However, this does not mean that British financial institutions
have been shut out of the business of foreign securities issues. Quite
the opposite, in fact. Nothing better illustrates Britain's evolving trans-
formation from investor to investment banker than the change in the
capital function of the City of London. British financial institutions
have been leaders in the development of the new market for "interna-
tional" bonds (Eurobonds), issues arranged by international under-
writing syndicates for sale in a number of different countries. The
market began only in 1963 when, with the imposition of the United
States Interest Equalization Tax effectively closing the New York
capital market to foreign borrowers, several London merchant banks
responded by organizing a series of foreign dollar loans. Since then the
market has grown by leaps and bounds, from a mere $137 million of
new issues in 1963 (60 per cent denominated in dollars) to almost $1.9
billion in 1967 (90 per cent in dollars) and to well over $2 billion in
1968.'° And while the market's growing internationalization has in-
evitably diluted London's initial monopoly, the City still remains
prominent in most underwriting syndicates; in fact, in the secondary
market the City still remains predominant." In short, British financial
institutions play the classic role of middlemen, channeling foreign-
owned funds to foreign borrowers, venturing none of their own capital.
Indeed, that is precisely why currencies other than sterling were used
Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report,/968, pp. 57—58.
""TheEurodollar Market: WhatIt Meansfor London," TheBanker,119, No. 522
(August,1969),p.777.40 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
in the first place: direct British resident participation in the market was
to be prevented.
2
ATseveral points in the course of this paper I have emphasized the
importance of exchange-control regulations in shaping the magnitude,
direction, and composition of British capital movements. However, by
no means does this emphasis imply that a constant force has been in
operation. In fact, there has been a marked ebb and flow in capital
restriction since it was first introduced three decades ago. Control
has been eased or augmented as the general balance-of-payments situ-
ation improved or deteriorated. During the war restriction was strin-
gent, but as soon as the war ended steps were taken gradually to loosen
control, paralleling the approach to convertibility on current account
in December 1958. Conversely, since 1961, and especially since the
beginning of the long payments crisis lasting from 1964, the trend has
been back again toward an intensification of regulation. Today (early
1970), British capital restriction is probably as tight as it has ever been.
As one might expect, most of the intensification of regulation has
affected investment outside the sterling area rather than insideit.
Portfolio investment is now even more thoroughly discouraged than
ever by a new requirement, dating from 1965, that 25 per cent of the
proceeds from sales of foreign securities be sold in the official exchange
market; only 75 per cent of proceeds are thus available for sale in the
investment-dollar market. And direct investment has been handi-
capped by a series of new administrative rulings, dating from 1961,
first setting stricter criteria for the eligibility of investments abroad;
then obliging investors to obtain the requisite foreign exchange in
the investment-dollar market at the current premium, rather than in
the regular market at the official exchange rate. However, recently
even within the sterling area investment has been affected. Relative
freedom of portfolio investment still prevails.'2 But since 1966 direct
Theon'y important exception dates from 1957 when, in order to close the notorious
Kuwait and Hong Kong "gaps," the authorities prohibited British purchases of non-
-4 4- . .,
-•1
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investmenthas been regulated by a so-called "voluntary" program
to limit outflows toward what is officially described as the "developed"
sterling area—defined as comprising Australia, Ireland, New Zealand,
and South Africa. These are the members, of course, that account for
the bulk of British investment within the bloc.
All of this does not leave much room for further restriction of
capital exports. Even if at some point the authorities should need
temporarily to turn another screw, they may well find it difficult to
locate one—unless they are willing to contemplate a virtually complete
embargo on new investments abroad. But even before that point is
reached a prior consideration intervenes, at least insofar as the over-
seas sterling area is concerned: further restrictions could endanger
the very foundations of Britain's monetary region. It is well known that
the outer members' privileged access to British capital is one of the
few frayed threads still holding the sterling bloc together:
The kernel of the sterling area arrangement, in so far as any
arrangement formally exists, is a quid pro quo: that Britain should
give the overseas sterling countries broadly free access to the
London capital and money market, and impose no exchange con-
trol on outward payments to them—in exchange for which these
countries will generally keep their external reserves at the Bank
of England, rather than in dollars or in gold.
The fear is that, if Britain ever rescinded its part of the bargain,
the sterling area countries could cause massive disturbances by 4
liquidatingtheir balances in London and demanding dollars and
gold that Britain could not pay)3
The fear of a run is a real one—and remains real despite the Basle
reform of the sterling area announced in 1968, which provided mem-
bers with an exchange guarantee of their sterling reserve balances.'4
Sterling-area countries still regard their access to British capital as
of the utmost importance. Andrew Shonfield's point has not lost its
force: "The essential fact is that the sterling area has changed its
sterlingsecurities fromoverseassteHing-arearesidents.See Peter B. Kenen. British
Monetorv Policy and the Balance of Payments. 1951—1957, Cambridge.Mass.. 1960,
pp. 150—152.
TheEconomist, February19, 1966, p. 72 I.
TheBasic Facthty and the Sterling Area (Cmnd.3787, October, 1968).r
I
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character. It has ceased to be an old-fashioned bank; its members now
regard it as an investment fund."In1966, following the announce-
• ment of the voluntary program affecting the developed sterling area,
the fear of a run was almost realized. Many sterling-area countries saw
the program as the thin edge of a wedge. One member, New Zealand,
• is reported to have made a definite threat to withdraw its reserves
from London.'6
Nevertheless, suppose the United Kingdom must temporarily turn
another screw, postponing for a time further investments overseas.
What is the direct income cost of capital restriction as a means of t:
adjusting the balance of payments in the short-term?
To attempt an answer to this question, we may concentrate on
direct investment outflows, since portfolio investments have on
balance been in a process of liquidation, rather than increasing, in s
recent years. What is striking about direct investment is its apparently
low level of relative profitability. Data compiled by several different
authors all point to the same conclusion, that the average return on
British direct investment overseas is at best only marginally higher
than the after-tax rate of return on comparable investments at home.'7
The most comprehensive study available is the Report by W. B. Red-
daway. He found that the most important returns from foreign invest-
ment are those that accrue through the level of after-tax profits and
through the net gain from "knowledge sharing" (knowledge of new d
techniques, new products, new methods of marketing, and so on). To-
gether, after appropriate adjustment of depreciation rates and also after
allowing for capital appreciation, these produce an operating return of
just 6 per cent a year on the total of capital invested abroad, as com-
pared with a domestic "opportunity" cost of at least 3 per cent a year.
Thus the net amount of gain for Britain annually seems to be no more
than approximately 3 per cent of the amount invested. Conversely, at
AndrewShonfield, BritishEconomic Policy Since the War, London,1958,p.128.
6 Cooper,ASuitable Case for Treatment: What to Do about the Balance of
Payments, London,1968, p. 230.
See,e.g., John H. Dunning, "Further Thoughts on Foreign Investment." Moorgare
and Wall Street, Autumn,1966, pp. 24—26; Richard N. Cooper, The Balance of Pay-
ments," in Richard E. Caves and Associates, Britain'sEconomic Prospects, Washing-
ton, 1968, pp. 175—176; and W. B. Reddaway in collaboration with S. J. Potter and C. T.
Taylor, Effectsof U.K.Directinvestment Overseas: Final Report, Cambridge,1968,
ch. 23—26. especially pp. 333—336.
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most just 3 per cent a year is lost if overseas investments are tem-
porarily restricted.'"
Richard Cooper calculated the medium-term "trade-offs" for the
United Kingdom between capital restriction and several alternative
means of achieving a given improvement in the balance of payments.
Assuming a decision to maintain a fixed rate of exchange, three of the
trade-offs—for capitalrestriction, traderestriction, and domestic
demand management (expenditure reduction)—are summarized in
Table 6.'" To improve the balance of payments by £100 million when
the exchange rate is fixed the authorities must reduce private capital
outflows across-the-board by £112 million.20 Alternatively, they must
impose an import surcharge on manufacturers of 4 per cent, or gener-
ate a rise in unemployment of .34 percentage points. Table 6 also
summarizes the direct annual cost of each of the three alternatives.
(The calculations for trade restriction and domestic demand manage-
ment are described in the appendix to this paper.) Capital restriction
is by far the cheapest means of adjustment—3 per cent of the post-
poned investment, or just £3 million a year. Trade restriction is more
expensive, some £45 million a year, and this is just a minimum esti-
mate; the cost would be higher if the form of trade restriction chosen
were more discriminatory than a uniform surcharge (say, differential
levies or import quotas). Demand management is the costliest alterna-
tive of million a year.
The key assumption here is that if investments abroad are temporarily restricted,
they will not be lost irrevocably: they will simply be postponed for a time, until the
balance-of-payments situation is reversed. Such an assumption is justified by the formu-
lation of the problem in the text, as one of s/w,i-ter,nadjustment.Britain's loss would
of course be greater if, in a longer-term context, it were assumed that some investments
would be lost irrevocably, rather than merely postponed.
Richard Cooper. op.cit., p.196.
2)have adjusted Cooper's calculation of this trade-off slightly. Cooper reckoned
that for a payments improvement of £100 million, an across-the-board reduction of
private capital outflows of £110 million would be required. This figure was based on
Professor Reddaway's interim study of the effects of British overseas investment, pub-
lished in 1967, which had estimated that for every £ 100 million of new capital outflow,
British exports rise (on average) by about £9 million. (Thus, 91: 100 = 100: 110.) How-
ever, after Cooper wrote, Reddaway's Fi,,al Report(1968)increased the estimated
rise of exports to £ 11 million. Cooper's calculation must therefore be increased to £112
million (89:100= 100:112). Reddaway's studies also indicate that in the longer term,
there will be a decline of balance-of-payments receipts equal to 4 per cent a year of the
initial reduction of capital outflows. See W. B. Reddaway in collaboration with J. 0. N.
Perkins. S. J. Potter, and C. T. Taylor. Effectsof U.K. Direct I,,,estmeni O"erseas:









£112 million £3 million
Trade restriction Import surcharges
on manufactur-
ers 1)
4 per cent £45 million
Domestic demandRise of unemploy-.34 percentage£245 million
management ment rate points
SOURCES: Richard N. Cooper, "The Balance of Payments," in Richard
E. Caves and Associates, Britain'sEconomic Prospects, Washington,1 968,
p. 196; and text and Appendix.
aPeryear, in terms of transactions levels of 1966. "Medium-term" effects,
after a period of adjustment.
Assumesno foreign retaliation.
The ranking of the three alternatives is about what we would
expect on the basis of a priori theoretical considerations.2' The im-
mense width of the range, however, is surprising. The loss from re-
striction of capital outflows is only one-fifteenth of the least cost result-
ing from trade restriction; and even the latter is rather slight as
compared with the loss from domestic expenditure reduction. Clearly,
the optimal course for Britain at times of short-term payments crisis,
given a decision to maintain a fixed rate of exchange, has been first
to postpone investments abroad. For this the government has been
frequently criticized: many experts have argued that if the exchange
rate itself cannot be changed, then domestic expenditure reduction
would be far preferable to the imposition of restrictions or controls
of any kind. But perhaps, the expectations of such experts to the con-
trary notwithstanding, the authorities have known what they were
doing after all.
2See,e.g.. Richard N. Cooper, The Economicsof Interdependence: Economic Policy
in the Atlantic Comm,,nitv, NewYork, 1968, pp. 249—259.
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APPENDIX
IN this appendix I describe my method of calculating the direct annual
income-cost of trade restriction and of domestic demand management
(expenditure reduction) as alternative means of adjusting the balance
of payments in the short term when the exchange rate is fixed. In the
text the results are summarized in Table 6.
DEMAND MANAGEMENT
Richard Cooper estimates that the trade-off between the unem-
ployment rate and the payments balance is on the order of 0.1 addi-
tional percentage points of the former for roughly every £29 million
improvement of the latter.22 For £ 100 million of improvement approxi-
mately .34 additional percentage points of unemployment would be
required.
As a rule, short-term fluctuations in employment tend to under-
state the corresponding fluctuations in gross income and output. That
is, in the short-term the rate of unemployment of labor typically varies
by less than the corresponding rate of employment of total capacity.
There are several reasons for The most important explanation is
that the rate of utilization of labor tends to change simultaneously.
Some workers, in production as well as administration, are regarded
by their employers as a kind of overhead: their number is neither re-
duced when there is a temporary decline in output, nor raised when
there is a temporary increase; instead, they simply work at a more or
less leisurely pace. Additional factors include changes in the length
of the work week and changes in the number of marginal workers en-
tering or leaving the labor force.
The precise relationship between unemployment and output is
not easy to identify. Frank Paish has suggested that a variation in the
rate of unemployment is associated with a variation in gross output
(sign changed) multiplied by a factor of five.24 However, this seems
RichardCooper,"The Balance of Payments," pp. 156—162.
23 See. e.g..ibid.,pp. 157—158; and F. W. Paish, Studies in aninflationary Econonn',
NewYork,1962, p.318.
24Ibid.,p.319.I
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an extraordinarily high figure; at any rate, Paish's evidence is sketchy
and not very convincing. Much more complete and convincing is the
evidence from two full-scale empirical investigations: one an inter-
national comparison by Brechling and O'Brien, the other a study of
the United Kingdom by Godley and Shepherd.25 Both sources produce
a virtually identical estimate of a factor of two. That is, both agree
that changes in gross output in Britain typically are about double the
corresponding (opposite) changes in the rate of unemployment.
This means that an increase of .34 percentage points of unemploy-
ment will be associated with a loss of .68 per cent of real national out-
put. In Britain in 1968 gross domestic product (which is the most
comprehensive measure of the output of the economy) stood at
£36,267 million. Approximately two-thirds of Iper cent of that is
some £245million.This indicates the order of magnitude of national
income that would have to be foregone (annual rate) if demand manage-
ment were the alternative chosen to achieve an additional £100
million improvement of the balance of payments in the short term.
TRADE RESTRICTION
Despite a long tradition of liberal commercial policies, Britain in
November 1964 unilaterally imposed a surcharge of 15 per cent on
imports of most manufactured products, ostensibly for balance-of-
payments purposes. Two years later (after having reduced the sur-
charge once, to 10 per cent, in April 1965) it was removed. There is
still disagreement regarding the effectiveness of the surcharge. When
first announced, it was expected to reduce imports by about £300
million a year. But according to the most systematic estimate to date,
by Johnston and Henderson, imports were in fact probably reduced by
only £156 million through the end of 1965, and by £72 million in
1966, both in terms of 1958 prices.26 Converting to 1964 prices sug-
Frank Brechling and Peter O'Brien,'Short-Run Fluctuationsin Manufacturing
Industries: An International Comparison," Ret'ieu.ofEcm,oniicsandSwtasttcs, August,
1967. pp. 277—287: and W. A. H. Godley andJ. R. Shepherd, "Long-Term Growth and
Short-Term Policy," NationalInstitute Economic Retien, August,964.pp.26—38.
Butcf. Richard N. Cooper, "The Balance of Payments," op. cit., p. 160, n. 26.
26John Johnston and Margaret Henderson, 'Assessing the Effects of the Import Sur-
charge," ManchesterSchoolof EconomicraidSocialScience,May, 1967, Pp. 89—110.THE UNITED KINGDOM AS EXPORTER OF CAPITAL•47
gests a reduction of £130 million during the year 1965 (excluding the
last quarter of 1964, which is included in the £156 million) and of
£80 million in 1966.27
However, Johnston and Henderson probably underestimated the
effectiveness of the surcharge, to the extent that the full amount of
the tax was not reflected in the price paid in Britain for manufactured
imports. The surcharge was known to be temporary. Accordingly,
many foreign exporters, wanting to maintain their position in the Brit-
ish market, may have absorbed some of it themselves. As Richard
Cooper points out, this possibility is supported by the fact that import
unit values, which had been rising steadily during the several years
before 1965, stopped rising in 1965 and 1966 despite continued price
increases in exporting countries. By adjusting for this possibility
Cooper increases the estimated effectiveness of the surcharge.28 His
calculation of the trade-off between a control of this kind and the pay-
ments balance (on the assumption of no direct foreign retaliation) is on
the order of approximately I additional percentage point of the former
for every £25millionimprovement of the latter. For £ 100 million of
improvement a surcharge of 4 per cent would be required.
A surcharge on this order—or, indeed, any trade control at all—is
bound to create an incidental loss of efficiency by protecting import-
competing industries. The misallocation of resources is the cost of the
improvement in the balance of payments. The magnitude of the cost
will depend on the flexibility of output and demand in the economy,
on the structure of prior trade restrictions, and especially on the nature
of the new trade restriction, in general, the more discriminatory bar-
riers to imports are, the greater are the distortions that are introduced
into the domestic price system. Conversely, the more uniform a new
barrier is, the smaller is the loss of income that will ensue.29 Britain's
surcharge in 1964 was applied uniformly to virtually all imports com-
peting with manufacturing industries at home. We may assume, there-
fore, that the cost of the surcharge, or of any control like it, represents
broadly the lowerlimitof the range of potential efficiency losses from
trade restriction.
Richard N. Cooper, "The Balance of Payments," p. 167.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.. p.252.
I.48INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
Therehas been surprisingly little empirical research by economists
into the efficiency losses of trade restrictions. However, what little
work has been done suggests that in developed economies such losses
tend to be very small for uniform tariffs or surcharges—certainly
d
tower than the corresponding losses of income that are necessitated by
deflations of equivalent impact on the balance of payments.3° At the
theoretical level, this suggestion has been confirmed by Harry Johnson.
Using a simplified but highly plausible model, he calculates
that both the total gains from international trade and the cost of
protection are likely to be relatively small in the large advanced
industrial countries, owing to their relatively flexible economic
structures, probably high elasticities of substitution among the
goods on which this consumption is concentrated, and relatively
low natural dependence on trade.u
We can use Johnson's calculations to estimate the cost for Brit-
ain of a 4 per cent surcharge on manufactured imports. As it happens,
the British do not have a relatively low natural dependence on trade;
in fact, imports run at between 16 and 17 per cent of gross national
product. But on the other hand, it happens that like other large ad-
vanced industrial countries, they do have a relatively high degree of
flexibility in both output and demand. If we assume that the elasticities
of substitution in production and consumption are each unity, we find
that the efficiency loss created by a 4 per cent surcharge amounts to
not more than 0. 13 per cent of free-trade output.32 Of course, we have
no idea what free-trade output might potentially be, but as an approxi-
mation we may instead take the most comprehensive statistical meas-
ure available of actual output—namely, gross domestic product. In
1968, 0.13 per cent of gross domestic product was roughly £45mil-
lion. This is indicative of the minimum amount of national income
that would have to be foregone (annual rate) if a uniform surcharge
Ibid., pp. 249—252 and 257—259. Existing empirical work on the efficiency losses
from trade restriction is summarized by Harvey Liebenstein, "Allocative Efficiency vs.
'X-Efficiency,'" American Economic Review, June, 1966,pp. 392—394.
31 Harry G. Johnson, "The Costs of Protection andSelf-Sufficiency," Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, August, 1965, p. 371.
32 This is composed of a consumption cost of approximately0.06 per cent (calculated
from Johnson, Table IA, p. 361) and a production cost of approximately 0.07per cent
(from Table 11, p. 365).
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werethe alternative chosen to achieve an additional £100 million
improvement of the balance of payments in the short term. If more
discriminatory forms of trade restriction were chosen (e.g., differen-
tial levies or import quotas), the cost would be correspondingly greater.
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